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Deacon: Federal Common Law Versus Agency Power: An Essay on Epic Systems

Federal Common Law versus Agency
Power:
An Essay on Epic Systems
Corporation v. Lewis
Daniel T. Deacon *
This essay examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis 1 from an administrative law perspective. Epic Systems invoked the Federal
Arbitration Act’s (FAA) guarantee that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract” 2 to invalidate the National Labor Relations Board’s
(NLRB) ruling that the use of class or collective-action waivers in certain employment contracts violated the federal labor laws. 3 This essay argues that Epic Systems
is part of a broader trend in which the Court has wrested control from administrative
agencies under the banner of normal statutory interpretation. But at least when it
comes to the FAA, the Court is engaged in statutory interpretation in name only. In
fact, over the years, the Court has refashioned the FAA into a form of court-administered federal common law, in which the sparse terms of the FAA have been transformed into “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” 4 which
sweeps much more broadly than the framers of the Act would have imagined. In
doing so, the Court has increasingly used the FAA to engage in policymaking of its
own, particularly when it comes to deciding whether otherwise neutral legal rules
in fact discriminate against arbitration agreements by “interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.” 5
Once it is recognized that the FAA has become a species of federal common
law, 6 it becomes easier to understand why the Court erred in Epic Systems in finding
that the NLRB could not use its interpretive authority under the labor laws to regulate the use of class-action waivers. The Court is a generalist body administering,
in the FAA, a trans-substantive statute. That statute’s purpose is ultimately to place
arbitration contracts “on an equal footing with other contracts.” 7 Any contract that
may otherwise be legal under federal or state law is subject to sectoral regulation
by agencies acting within the scope of their authority. By sealing off arbitration
agreements in particular from federal regulatory authorities, the Court is in fact
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
1. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
3. See generally Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1612.
4. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
5. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
6. I follow Thomas Merrill in defining federal common law as “any federal rule of decision that is
not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text.” Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).
7. AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 339.
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privileging those agreements, not putting them on equal footing with other kinds of
contracts. 8
Part I of this essay expands on these arguments in the context of Epic Systems.
Part II places Epic Systems in the context of broader developments in administrative
law. These developments have seen the courts—and, in particular, certain judges
and Justices—engage in statutory interpretation in order to defeat agency efforts at
regulation. Under the surface, however, the courts have in fact engaged in a kind
of judicial policymaking of a form that often privileges private property, free exchange, and reducing regulatory compliance costs over the more diffuse public benefits that may flow from regulation. Part II illustrates this trend by examining Justice (then Judge) Kavanaugh’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in United
States Telecom Association v. FCC. 9

I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, FEDERAL COMMON LAW, AND
AGENCY POWER
A. The FAA as Federal Common Law
The Federal Arbitration Act traces its roots to 1925. 10 At the time of its enactment, the framers of the Act intended to guarantee that federal courts would honor
parties’ agreement that disputes between them be heard by private arbitral tribunals,
as well as to prevent courts from adopting rules that discriminated against arbitration specifically. 11 The scope of the Act was also considered limited in important
ways. Members of Congress shared an understanding that the Act only applied in
federal, not state courts, and it did not displace state law regulating arbitration. 12
Congress also did not intend the FAA to cover employment agreements. 13 In fact,
“[i]n passing the FAA, Congress intended to allow arbitration for only a narrow set
of legal claims: inter-merchant contract disputes sounding in breach and maritime
claims.” 14 Congress also envisioned the Act as applying to agreements between
parties of roughly equal bargaining power. 15 Congress did not intend the Act to
apply to federal statutory claims as opposed to contractual ones. 16
Over time, each of these limitations has fallen away. 17 The FAA now applies
to all kinds of claims, with certain very narrow exceptions, whether brought in state
or federal court. 18 The FAA has been read to broadly preempt state rules affecting
8. This argument builds on Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 991
(2017).
9. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
10. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts,
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2860 (2015).
11. See id. at 2860-61; see also David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 44445 (2011).
12. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 126-27 (2006); David S.
Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23-25 (2004); Horton, supra note 11, at 445-46.
13. Horton, supra note 11, at 446.
14. Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 307 (2015).
15. Horton, supra note 11, at 447.
16. Leslie, supra note 14, at 307-08.
17. See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 8, at 999-1001.
18. Id.
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arbitration agreements, erecting a near-ironclad rule that all procedural provisions
contained within a contract, which also contain an arbitration clause, must be honored “according to their terms.” 19 The judicial expansion of the FAA has led Justice
O’Connor to claim that “the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case
by case, an edifice of its own creation.” 20
One might respond to the above by claiming that, in the recent cases, the Court
is acting simply as a good textualist. The FAA’s text does, after all, make arbitration agreements generally enforceable, and many of the above limits, besides the
exclusion of employment agreements, do not appear plainly on the surface of the
Act. Textualism can only get the Court so far. This is especially apparent when it
comes to the FAA’s saving clause, which was central to Epic Systems. That clause
“permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable ‘upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” 21 The Court has
said that the clause does not operate to save contractual defenses that either target
arbitration directly or that “interfere[] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.” 22
For example, in Concepcion, the Court dealt with a California unconscionability
rule that, in certain circumstances, declared class waivers unenforceable, whether
or not they were in a contract which contained an arbitration clause. The Court held
the rule was preempted by the FAA. In doing so, the Court applied its own sense
of arbitration’s “fundamental attributes” and, notwithstanding the fact that arbitral
organizations had been actively developing their own rules for class arbitration, declared those attributes inconsistent with class processes.
Thus, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the FAA’s saving clause is a powerful tool through which to assert the Court’s own power in the area, essentially
allowing the Court to decide which generally applicable contractual rules conflict
with the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration and which do not, guided only by a
very general sense of what arbitration typically looks like, today or in 1925. And
the saving clause is not the only aspect of the FAA that allows the courts to exercise
their own discretion. Courts are also put in charge of deciding such amorphous
questions as whether there is there is an “‘inherent conflict’ between arbitration”
and another federal law’s “underlying purposes,” 23 and whether certain procedural
restrictions in arbitration agreements undermine the “effective vindication” of federal laws. 24 Plainly, courts today exercise a large amount of discretion to decide
whether certain rules should apply in the arbitration context. And the courts, and
the Supreme Court in particular, have generally decided that question one way; Arbitration agreements should be enforced according to their terms. But that conclusion results not from a mechanical application of the text of the FAA and certainly
not from the intent of the Act’s framers. It has been, in large part, a choice made
by the Supreme Court itself.
19. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see also Leslie, supra note 14, at 312
(“The Court has converted its judge-made presumption of arbitrability into a presumption of contract
terms being enforceable as long as they are inserted into an arbitration clause.”).
20. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995); see also Resnik, supra
note 10, at 112.
21. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
22. Id. at 344.
23. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
24. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 242 (2013).
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B. Epic Systems and Agency Power
Epic Systems, written by Justice Gorsuch, treated the question of whether the
FAA prevented the NLRB from banning class waivers located in arbitration agreements as a simple question of statutory interpretation. “[A]s a matter of law the
answer is clear,” the Court declared. “Congress has instructed the federal courts to
enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms—including terms providing
for individualized proceedings.” 25 The FAA’s saving clause did not apply for the
same reason given in Concepcion; Requiring class procedures would interfere with
what the Court viewed as one of the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration. 26 And
because, according to the Court, this meant that the FAA could not otherwise accommodate the NLRB’s ruling, that ruling must flow from a “clear and manifest
congressional command to displace the Arbitration Act.” 27 Nor could the NLRB
take shelter under Chevron, which would normally allow the NLRB the power to
interpret ambiguous provisions of the labor laws. Not only did the “canon against
reading conflicts into statutes” take the NLRB’s preferred interpretation off the table, but, the Court declared, “[T]he Board hasn’t just sought to interpret its statute,
the NLRA, in isolation: it has sought to interpret this statute in a way that limits the
work of a second statute, the Arbitration Act.” 28 Thus, one of the premises undergirding Chevron—that Congress intends the agency to resolve ambiguities in the
statutes it administers—was missing. 29
Here is not the place to critique the Court’s interpretation of the federal labor
laws. Rather, I want to step back and assess Epic Systems from a broader institutional perspective. The Court’s fundamental mistake was in failing to recognize the
kind of statute that the FAA is. The FAA is, at bottom, a statute that says a certain
kind of contract is enforceable like any other contract. It is a general statute. That
is, it applies regardless of the kind of transaction in question or parties involved.
And it is administered by the courts in a way that, as I argued above, has allowed
for judicial innovation over time and calls for judicial policy judgments at various
critical junctures.
Once the FAA is viewed in this way, it becomes easier to see why an agency
should be able to interpret its statute in ways that restrict arbitration agreements or
that interfere with arbitration’s “fundamental attributes.” Agencies commonly regulate against a background of a more permissive, general legal regime. Indeed, one
might say that is their very purpose. When the Environmental Protection Agency
restricts emissions from coal-fired power plants, it is interfering with the preexisting
legal entitlement of the owners of such plants to emit pollutants into the air as long
as doing so does not create a nuisance under state tort law. And when an agency
says that a certain kind of contract is illegal, assuming it has the power to do so, that
act is only meaningful because the background law would otherwise make it enforceable. We allow agencies to depart from background law because they are performing a specialized task, and their particular knowledge and experience with a
given issue gives them special insight when determining whether exceptions should
be made to otherwise lawful activity.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
Id. at 1622.
Id. at 1624.
Id. at 1629.
Id.
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The same dynamic exists when the two legal regimes in question both trace to
federal statutes. 30 Take the interaction of the federal antitrust laws, and the Sherman
Act in particular, with the regulatory regime administered by the Federal Communications Commission under the Communications Act. When the FCC has acted to
enforce network neutrality, it has adopted what amounts to a per se ban on certain
kinds of vertical contracts—for example, contracts that obligate Internet service
providers to grant priority to network traffic associated with certain services. 31
Such contracts are treated very differently under the court-administered Sherman
Act, 32 where they are judged according to a rather permissive “rule of reason” inquiry, with the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate anticompetitive effect. 33 But to
my knowledge, no one (including opponents of net neutrality) has argued that the
antitrust laws should bar the FCC from exercising its Chevron authority in order to
regulate certain contracts more stringently than background antitrust law. And the
courts have upheld the FCC’s authority to do so with scarcely a mention of the
Sherman Act. 34
In these examples, we can see clearly that agencies often act against the backdrop of some other source of law, including federal law, that would otherwise treat
the activity in question as legal. Agencies in these situations normally have no
obligation to bend over backwards in order to accommodate the more permissive
legal regime—indeed, doing so would be in many cases antithetical to their missions. So why should the FAA be any different? The FAA says that a certain kind
of contract is enforceable to the same extent that other kinds of contracts are. As
the dissent in Epic Systems pointed out, “[t]hrough the Arbitration Act, Congress
sought ‘to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not
more so.’” 35 By erecting an impenetrable wall around the permissive legal regime
established by the FAA and elaborated by the courts, the Epic Systems majority
failed to appreciate the ways in which agency regulation commonly operates, and
in doing so, it unduly privileged the federal common law over legitimate claims of
regulatory power.

II. THE GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATION BY COURT
In this Part, I will argue that Epic Systems is part of a broader trend in which
the courts have begun to use court-administered rules to trump the power of agencies. Although there are several possible examples of this trend, I will focus here
on one (in addition to the use of the FAA): the growth of the “major questions” or
30

For a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between the FAA and other federal statutes that
shares some similarities, but also has some differences, with the one offered here, see David L. Noll,

Arbitration Conflicts, Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186735.
31. See generally IN THE MATTER OF PROTECTING & PROMOTING THE OPEN INTERNET, 30 FCC RCD.
5601 (2015).
32. On the Sherman Act as a body of court-administered federal common law, see, e.g., Margaret H.
Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S.
CAL. L. REV. 405 (2008).
33. See Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, The Law and Economics of Network Neutrality, 45
IND. L. REV. 767, 803 (2012).
34. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
35. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)).
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“major rules” doctrine. Using that doctrine, the Supreme Court and some lower
courts have seized interpretive authority from administrative agencies and transferred it to the courts. Although the courts say that they are doing so to honor the
intent of Congress, the malleability of the major questions doctrine allows the courts
significant discretion in its application, discretion that often amounts to a policy
judgment concerning the substance of the agency rule in question.
The major questions doctrine is an exception to Chevron’s command that
courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations in cases of statutory ambiguity.
Although the doctrine has antecedents going back several decades, 36 I will focus on
two recent applications: Chief Justice Roberts’ version of the doctrine in King v.
Burwell and Justice Kavanaugh’s in the D.C. Circuit net neutrality appeal. King
concerned the availability of tax credits for individuals to buy health insurance in
states that had not established insurance exchanges following enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (sometimes known as “Obamacare”). 37
The Internal Revenue Service answered that question in the affirmative. Under
normal deference principles that answer would stand, provided the statute was ambiguous and the IRS’s interpretation reasonable. But the Court held that normal
deference principles didn’t apply. It explained itself with only the following:
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars
in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of
people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question
of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to this statutory
scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would
have done so expressly. It is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance
policy of this sort. This is not a case for the IRS. 38
Instead of deferring to the IRS’s views the Supreme Court interpreted the statute itself and determine its “correct reading,” without reference to the IRS’s view.
In doing so, the Court in King found that the correct reading of the statute was in
fact the one preferred by the agency. But the Court was clear: It was for the courts,
and not the IRS, to make that call.
Two features of the King move are worthy of attention. First, the explanation
for why the question was a “major” one is left remarkably vague. The only real
explanation given is that the case involved a lot of money and affected a lot of
people. But that is true for many agency decisions. Where is the line to be drawn?
The Court has not said. Second, the rationale for the doctrine is left similarly unclear. King says that it is following Congress’s lead by presuming that Congress
would not wish such major questions to be left to agency determination. But the
King majority failed to comprehend that the question is a comparative one; Would
Congress rather prefer agencies or courts to resolve ambiguities, even when doing
so would have “major” consequences? As Cass Sunstein has argued, there are good
reasons to think that the traditional justifications for allocating such decisions to
agencies apply equally, or even more so, in the context of “major questions.” 39
36. For a history of the doctrine, see Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions,
70 VAND. L. REV. 777 (2017).
37. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
38. Id. at 2489 (internal citations omitted).
39. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 243 (2006) (criticizing major questions exception in part because “expertise and accountability, the linchpins of Chevron’s legal fiction,
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King thus allows courts to transfer interpretive authority away from agencies
and toward themselves using a vague and malleable rubric for determining “majorness,” and without explanation for why doing so is faithful to Congress’s intent. A
slightly different version of the doctrine was deployed by Justice Kavanaugh in his
dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in the D.C. Circuit’s recent net neutrality
appeal. 40 That appeal concerned the FCC’s decision to reclassify Internet service
providers—companies such as Comcast and Verizon—as “telecommunications carriers” under the Communications Act. That decision had the consequence of applying a set of “common carrier” obligations to such companies under Title II of
the Act. The D.C. Circuit panel upheld the FCC’s authority to do so; the Act was
ambiguous regarding whether ISPs qualified as telecommunications carriers, and
the FCC’s determination that they did so qualify was reasonable under Chevron. 41
Justice Kavanaugh would have granted the ISPs rehearing petition and held
that the FCC did not have such authority. He would have done so using a different
version of the “major questions” doctrine, which he relabeled the “major rules”
doctrine. Under the “major rules” doctrine, Congress must “clearly authorize[]”
“major rules.” 42 That rule in essence flips the Chevron inquiry. Instead of determining whether there is an ambiguity resolved by the agency in a reasonable way,
the court must instead determine whether there is a clear indication that Congress
intended the agency to act in this way. When does that rule apply? Justice Kavanaugh states that it applies when “an agency wants to exercise expansive regulatory authority over some major social or economic activity.” 43 Although conceding
that “determining whether a rule constitutes a major rule sometimes has a bit of a
‘know it when you see it’ quality,” Justice Kavanaugh would have found the rule in
United States Telecom Association to be a “major” one because it applied common
carrier regulations to ISPs, which had not been done before. 44
I have argued elsewhere that Justice Kavanaugh’s version of the “major rules”
doctrine suffers from a hidden baseline problem. 45 If whether ISPs qualify as “telecommunications carriers” is truly ambiguous, then it would seem that any answer
to that question—yes or no—would have potentially “major” consequences. 46 After all, failures to regulate can also have significant costs. What Justice Kavanaugh
seemed to say was that rules that cause significant costs or other disruption to regulated entities must be clearly authorized by Congress. But why is that a fair understanding of Congress’s intent? Congress is presumably aware that lack of regulation can also have negative consequences, and it has (by hypothesis) not supplied
an answer of its own. The “major rules” doctrine, at least as deployed by Justice
Kavanaugh, thus appears to artificially disfavor pro-regulatory agency decisions.
And because whether the “major rules” doctrine applies will, as Justice Kavanaugh
conceded, often amount to an ad hoc judgment by the reviewing court. The doctrine
are highly relevant to the resolution of major questions; it follows that so long as the governing statute
is ambiguous, such questions should be resolved by agencies, not by courts”).
40. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
41. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 825 F.3d 674, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
42. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 418 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
43. Id. at 421.
44. Id. at 422-23.
45. See Daniel T. Deacon, Judge Kavanaugh and “Weaponized Administrative Law”, YALE J. ON REG.
(July 11, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-kavanaugh-and-weaponized-administrative-law-by-daniel-deacon/.
46. See id.
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allows the courts significant discretion to curtail pro-regulatory agency decisions
where the court concludes that the costs associated with the agency action are
simply too high and seemingly without reference to any benefits that might be captured by the agency action.
What does all this have to do with Epic Systems, the subject of this trio contained in this Journal issue? I believe that Epic Systems is part of a trend that is also
reflected in the “major questions” cases. The courts in these cases speak in the
language of statutory interpretation. They are all nominally about what Congress
might intend or what it has commanded. But in fact, the expansion of these doctrines reflects a privileging of the courts’ power, not Congress’s. In each case, the
Court reserves for itself significant discretionary power. It wields that power—
often, though not always—to curtail agency efforts at regulation, even in situations
where according to the otherwise generally applicable rules the agency’s word
should prevail. With the recent additions of Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh
to the Supreme Court, we are likely to see a continuation of this trend. Whether it
eventually expands to the elimination of Chevron altogether is anyone’s guess.
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